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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






OSCAR ROBERTO CORDOVA-MELGAR, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                 Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A024-308-195) 
Immigration Judge: Eugene Pugliese  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 11, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 








Oscar Roberto Cordova-Melgar (“Cordova”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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Cordova, a native and citizen of Guatamala, was issued an Order to Show Cause 
on January 30, 1990, alleging that he entered the United States without inspection on 
January 5, 1985.  The former Immigration and Naturalization Service charged that he was 
deportable under former section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration & Nationality Act 
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994).  Cordova failed to appear and was ordered 
deported in absentia.  In 2007, proceedings were reopened at Cordova’s request.  In 
2008, he appeared before an Immigration Judge and conceded deportability.  He also 
filed a Form I-881, Application for Suspension of Deportation or Special Rule 
Cancellation of Removal under Section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act (“NACARA”), Pub. L. No. 105-100 § 203, 111 Stat. 2160, 2196-
2200 (November 19, 1997), and a Form EOIR-40, Application for Suspension of 
Deportation, under former section 244(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994). 
 During his individual merits hearing, Cordova testified that he registered for the 
benefits of the class action settlement in American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 
F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991), with the assistance of an immigration attorney, Maria 
Valez.  A.R. 86.  When questioned specifically about his “ABC benefits” registration, 
however, he could not remember when he applied, see id., whether forms were actually 
submitted, or if he had paid any fees.  See id. at 102-103.  Regarding his family, Cordova 
testified that one of his daughters lives in the United States, but his wife, father and other 
children all live in Guatemala.  Cordova testified that he has paid taxes under one of his 
two social security numbers, and that he underwent surgery for stomach cancer and may 
need additional treatment, although he is in remission and not currently taking medication 
or following a special diet. 
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In an oral decision dated December 5, 2008, the IJ denied Cordova’s applications 
and ordered him removed to Guatemala.  The IJ first noted that, for Guatemalan nationals 
who meet certain requirements, there is a presumption that deportation or removal from 
the United States would result in extreme hardship.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.64(d)(1).  The IJ 
then determined that Cordova failed to establish the facts necessary to qualify for the 
presumption of extreme hardship.  His asylum application had to have been filed by April 
1, 1990, see id. at § 1240.61(a), but it was filed at the earliest on November 4, 1991.  In 
the alternative, he had to have filed his ABC class registration form by December 31, 
1991, see id.  The IJ examined the documents Cordova submitted to demonstrate his 
registration: a letter written by the attorney who assisted him, Ms. Valez, with an ABC 
registration form attached.  The IJ could not, however, discern the date on the letter, and 
the registration form was undated.  (It appeared to the IJ that the attorney’s letter was 
dated November, 1992, which would have made the registration untimely.)  Moreover, 
the problems with Cordova’s documentation were not corrected by his testimony because 
he was unable to remember when he registered for ABC benefits, or any of the specifics 
of his registration.  Accordingly, the IJ concluded that Cordova did not establish that he 
had registered for ABC class benefits before the December 31, 1991.  In sum, he could 
not establish either of the facts necessary to qualify for the presumption of extreme 




The IJ then examined the factors set forth in Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 
596 (BIA 1978), to determine if Cordova met the extreme hardship requirement.
1
  Within 
this framework, the IJ determined that Cordova’s stomach cancer, which had been treated 
and was in remission, and his family ties in the United States, were insufficient to 
establish extreme hardship either to himself or a qualifying relative when balanced 
against the fact that his wife and grown children reside in Guatemala, and he has lived 
most of his life in Guatemala.  The IJ also denied Cordova’s applications in the exercise 
of his overall discretion, in part because Cordova had reaped the benefits of Medicaid 
without faithfully paying his taxes (for example, he admitted that he claimed his daughter 
as a dependent on his return even though she did not live with him and did not qualify as 
a dependent), and because he had two social security numbers.  He also had made no 
showing of service to the community.  Cordova filed an appeal with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. 
On September 8, 2010, the Board dismissed the appeal.  The Board reasoned that 
the IJ’s factual findings concerning the dates when Cordova may have filed his asylum 
application and ABC class benefits registration were not clearly erroneous, 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(d)(3).  Specifically, the Board agreed that the date on Cordova’s attorney’s ABC 
class registration letter was indiscernible.  The Board noted that it appeared to have been 
prepared sometime in November, but the exact date in November and year were 
indiscernible.  Furthermore, Cordova had testified that he did not know that the ABC 
registration form had ever actually been submitted.  Accordingly, the Board agreed with 
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 The IJ also looked at whether Cordova established the continuous physical presence 
requirement and concluded that sufficient documentation was presented to establish that 
he was continuously present in the United States for seven years. 
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the IJ that Cordova was not entitled to the presumption of extreme hardship because he 
could not establish that he had complied with either of the critical deadlines for 
Guatemalan nationals.  With respect to the IJ’s determination on the merits of the 
extreme hardship issue, the Board rejected Cordova’s argument that the IJ failed to 
adequately take his cancer into consideration.  The Board held that the IJ properly 
considered the relevant factors of age, family circumstances, length of residence in the 
United States, health, involvement in the community, and immigration history, as 
required by Matter of Anderson, 16 I. & N. Dec. 596, and Matter of Pilch, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 627 (BIA 1996).
2
 
Cordova timely petitioned for review and sought a stay of removal, which the 
Government did not oppose.  We granted Cordova a stay of removal.  Cordova then filed 
his Informal Brief, in which he argued that the IJ gave little or no weight to his cancer 
treatment evidence, failed to consider the hardship factors cumulatively, and thus 
committed an abuse of discretion.  In ¶ 7 of the brief, Cordova alleged without 
elaboration that the Board and IJ erred in not giving him the presumption of hardship.  
The Government then filed a motion to dismiss the petition for review, contending that 
we lacked jurisdiction over the agency’s discretionary determination of extreme hardship, 
see Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that every 
other circuit to have considered the question has concluded that the extreme hardship 
determination under former INA § 244 is a discretionary one).  This motion was referred 
by Order of the Court to a merits panel.  In the Order, we directed the parties to address 
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 Given the determination of no extreme hardship, the Board did not reach the IJ’s 




in their briefs whether the Board’s determination that Cordova did not qualify for the 
presumption of extreme hardship was non-discretionary and thus reviewable, see Bernal-
Vallejo v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 195 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 1999).  Our 
Clerk then issued an order inviting Cordova to file a supplemental brief on the 
jurisdictional issue.  The Government has filed its responsive brief.  The petition for 
review is now ripe for decision. 
 We will deny the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  We generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), (b)(1).  We generally review the Board’s 
decision, although we also review the IJ’s decision to the extent the Board adopted or 
deferred to it.  See Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005).   
Prior to the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), an alien who was subject to deportation could qualify for 
suspension of deportation, and then adjustment of status, if he could demonstrate that: (1) 
he had been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of seven 
years, (2) he had been a person of good moral character, and (3) his deportation would 
result in extreme hardship to himself or an immediate family member who was a United 
States citizen or a lawful permanent resident.  INA § 244(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) 
(repealed).  After section 244 was repealed and replaced by cancellation of removal, see 
generally 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), Congress enacted NACARA, which made certain 
favorable changes to IIRIRA for Guatemalan nationals (among others) whose 
immigration proceedings commenced prior to IIRIRA’s effective date.  See NACARA § 
203(a)(1), 111 Stat. at 2196-2200. 
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For Guatemalan nationals, eligibility for relief under NACARA can be established 
by either (1) filing an application for asylum on or before April 1, 1990; or (2) first 
entering the United States on or before October 1, 1990, and registering for benefits 
under the settlement agreement in American Baptist Churches, 760 F. Supp. 796, on or 
before December 31, 1991.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.60, 1240.61(a)(1)-(2).  See also §§ 
1240.65(b)(1)-(3), 1240.66(b)(2)-(4) (2011).  For those who meet specified criteria and 
have submitted the appropriate application, there is a presumption that deportation or 
removal from the United States would result in extreme hardship, thus fulfilling the 
extreme hardship requirement for suspension of deportation, see id. at § 1240.64(d)(2).  
The burden is on the applicant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is 
eligible for suspension of deportation or special rule cancellation of removal.  See id. at § 
1240.64(a)(1). 
 The Government, in its responsive brief, see Respondent’s Brief, at 16, has agreed 
with us that the agency’s “no presumption of extreme hardship” determination, a central 
issue in Cordova’s case, is indeed reviewable because it is factual and non-discretionary.  
Cf. Bernal-Vallejo, 195 F.3d 56, 62-63 (while the extreme hardship requirement is 
discretionary and non-reviewable, the continuous physical presence question is factual 
and non-discretionary and thus reviewable).  The presumption of extreme hardship 
determination may be reached by answering either one of two factual questions: first, is 
the individual a registered ABC class member as of December 31, 1991, or second, did 
he file an application for asylum on or before April 1, 1990.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.61(a)(1)-
(2).  There is no exercise of discretion in answering these factual questions.  Accordingly, 
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the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied as 
presented, and we will review the merits of this factual and non-discretionary question. 
 The scope of review of the agency’s determination of facts is narrow.  The 
agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C.§ 1252(b)(4)(B).  See also Jarbough v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 483 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e are not triers of fact, and 
Congress mandates that we leave the agency’s factfinding undisturbed unless the 
evidence compels a contrary conclusion.”).  With respect to the presumption of extreme 
hardship, Cordova must show that the evidence relating to the necessary facts was “so 
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find” in his favor.  Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992). 
 Here, the agency determined that Cordova failed to establish that he filed an 
asylum application on or before April 1, 1990 or that he registered for ABC benefits 
before December 31, 1991.  The agency determined that his documentary evidence and 
testimony were insufficient to meet his burden of proof.  Insofar as his asylum 
application is dated November 4, 1991, clearly no reasonable factfinder would be 
compelled to conclude that it was filed before the April 1, 1990 deadline.  The question 
of whether Cordova timely registered for ABC benefits is closer, but, on this record, we 
must defer to the agency’s factfinding.  The date on the letter written by the attorney who 
assisted Cordova, A.R. 176, is, as the Board concluded, indiscernible, and the attached 
ABC registration, see id. at 177, is, indeed, undated.  Moreover, the problems with 
Cordova’s documentation were not, as the agency determined, corrected by his 
testimony.  Although he testified that he registered for ABC benefits with the assistance 
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of Ms. Valez, see id. at 86, when questioned about the details, he could not remember 
when he applied, see id., or whether forms actually were submitted on his behalf, see id. 
at 102-103.  We note that Cordova’s attorney before the Board argued in his brief on 
appeal that the date on the letter written by Ms. Valez is “November 1991,” id. at 8, and 
we acknowledge that, because the asylum application was dated November 4, 1991, it is 
logical to assume that the ABC registration form was prepared in the same month, but we 
are not the triers of fact here, and this circumstantial evidence does not compel a 
conclusion that Cordova filed his ABC class registration form by December 31, 1991.  
Accordingly, we uphold the agency’s determination that Cordova was not entitled to the 
presumption of extreme hardship.  
Without the presumption, Cordova was required to show extreme hardship to 
himself or a qualifying relative.  This is a discretionary determination.  Mendez-
Moranchel, 338 F.3d at 179.  IIRIRA’s transitional rules, which apply here, provide that 
“there shall be no appeal of any discretionary decision under” section 244 of the INA as 
of the date of the enactment of the Act.  IIRIRA § 309(c)(4)(E).  Accordingly, we lack 
jurisdiction to review Cordova’s challenge to the discretionary determination that he 
failed to establish extreme hardship under former section 244.  See, e.g., Najjar v. 
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2001); Rodriguez v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 797, 
799 (5th Cir. 2001); Escalera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 222 F.3d 753, 755 
(10th Cir. 2000); Bernal-Vallejo., 195 F.3d at 63. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss 
it in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
